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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PAMELA HARRIS-SAMMS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11490 
-and-
MANHASSET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PAMELA HARRIS-SAMMS, pro se, Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (BRUCE MILLMAN, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Pamela Harris-
Samms to the Director's dismissal of her improper practice charge 
against the Manhasset Union Free School District (District) which 
alleges a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act). 
Harris-Samms filed her charge on March 1, 1990. In it, she 
alleges that on November 23, 1988, the District discharged her 
from her teaching position "for reasons that I am not sure 
of...." The charge then refers to problems involving teaching 
responsibilities. The discharge actually became effective on or 
about February 8, 1989. 
The Director dismissed the charge because it contained no 
allegation or proof of facts which would establish that the 
District's conduct interfered with Harris-Samms1 Taylor Law 
Board - U-11490 
-2 
rights and because the charge was not filed within four months of 
the alleged improper conduct, the'termination of her employment. 
Harris-Samms excepts to both of the bases for the Director's 
dismissal of her charge. The District filed a response to the 
exceptions and argued in support of affirming the Director's 
decision. 
In support of her exceptions, Harris-Samms submitted 
material which had not been submitted to the Director. To the 
extent that this material raises new issues or includes new 
evidence, we have not considered it as it is not part of the 
record on review.-3=/ 
We affirm the Director's conclusion that Harris-Samms failed 
to allege or prove facts that the District's conduct in 
discharging her was intended to or had the effect of depriving 
her of her rights to form, join, or participate in an employee 
organization or to refrain from such activity and that, 
therefore, she failed to state a claim which can invoke the 
protections of the Act. 
In arguing that her charge is timely, Harris-Samms urges 
that her attempt to employ alternative means of redressing her 
discharge extended the four-month limitations period set out in 
§204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure. We affirm the 
Director's decision that such efforts do not extend the four-
^Margolin v. Newman. 130 A.D.2d 312, 20 PERB ^7018 (3d 
Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB ?[7005 
(1988) . 
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month filing period and that, therefore, her charge was not 
timely.-2/ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
•^/city School District of the City of New York, 
19 PERB [^3066 (1986) ; New York State Public Employees Federation 
fFarkas) , 15 PERB 5[3005 (1982). 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DON ALAN MCLAUGHLIN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10355 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL NO. 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
DON ALAN MCLAUGHLIN, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (MARY E. MORIARTY, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Don Alan 
McLaughlin to the dismissal, after hearing, of his improper 
practice charge against the United Federation of Teachers, Local 
No. 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT). The charge alleges that the UFT 
violated §§209-a.2(a) and (b) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) in connection with the UFT's handling of 
certain disputes between McLaughlin and his employer, the Board 
of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District). 
The instant charge arose following McLaughlin's termination 
from employment, without notice by the District, as a temporary 
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per diem teacher in early March 1988. Thereafter, McLaughlin 
alleges that, on March 18, 1988, he was given improperly 
motivated incorrect advice concerning the filing of a grievance 
challenging his termination, in that he was advised that no 
viable grievance existed. Upon further inquiry to Paul Gershon, 
a UFT district representative, McLaughlin learned that the 
collective bargaining agreement between the UFT and the District 
provides for a ten-day notice period prior to termination, and 
filed a grievance on his own behalf. 
The grievance proceeded through the first two steps of the 
grievance procedure, apparently without challenge to its 
timeliness. During the same time frame, Gershon sought from the 
District, and obtained, a commitment that if McLaughlin so 
desired, he would be provided with an additional ten days of 
work, in settlement of his contract grievance. The 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) credited Gershon's testimony that: 
1) ten additional days of work is a commonly accepted resolution 
of claims of violation of the ten-day notice requirement 
contained in the parties' agreement; 2) Gershon communicated the 
offer of ten additional days of work to McLaughlin, and 
McLaughlin rejected the offer, stating that the termination 
itself should be set aside and full back pay from the date of the 
purported termination to his reinstatement was the appropriate 
remedy; and 3) Gershon thereafter informed McLaughlin that the 
UFT's grievance committee declined to process McLaughlin's 
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grievance beyond the step two level because the rejected 
settlement offer was a reasonable resolution of the grievance and 
McLaughlin was not entitled to the remedial relief sought by him. 
In a June 6, 1988 telephone conversation, Gershon advised 
McLaughlin of the committee's decision. He also informed 
McLaughlin of the procedure for appealing the committee's 
decision. McLaughlin testified that he requested that Gershon 
confirm both the basis for the committee's decision and the 
appeal procedure in writing. However, McLaughlin later followed 
up, in a letter dated June 28, 1988, with a written request only 
that Gershon further explain the reasons for the committee's 
decision. The June 28 correspondence does not request further 
explanation of the procedure for appealing the grievance 
committee's decision. Gershon did not respond to the letter, 
asserting that he did not receive it until after the summer 
vacation, when the UFT's district office was closed. 
In addition to the foregoing, McLaughlin also wrote to 
Gershon on June 23, 1988, in reference to his "grievance 
statement", stating that "I have yet to be compensated for those 
days prior to my improper termination". Apparently construing 
this correspondence to constitute an additional request for 
assistance on the matter of the termination without ten days* 
notice, Gershon took no further action, having already advised 
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McLaughlin that the UFT would not further proceed with that 
grievance. At the pre-hearing conference in this matter, 
McLaughlin explained that his June 23 letter was intended to 
refer to days when he in fact worked prior to his termination, 
but for which he was not paid, and was not intended to refer to 
the termination asserted to be improper by virtue of the absence 
of a ten-day notice period. Upon learning this information, 
Gershon investigated the allegation, and subsequently procured 
for McLaughlin four days of pay and additional monies, totalling 
$1,400. 
The ALJ determined that Gershon*s failure to follow up on 
the June 23 correspondence, which he believed related to the 
contract grievance, was not unreasonable in view of the repeated 
references in McLaughlin's letter to his grievance and in view of 
the reference to his "improper termination". In addition, the 
ALJ considered the fact that, upon learning of the true nature of 
McLaughlin's complaint in this regard, Gershon acted promptly to 
correct the problem, and found that the earlier failure to act 
upon McLaughlin's complaint in this regard was neither arbitrary, 
discriminatory, nor done in bad faith. We agree with the ALJ's 
conclusion in this regard. 
The ALJ found untimely the aspect of McLaughlin's charge 
which alleges improper motive in the giving of incorrect advice 
about challenging his termination. He also determined that 
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McLaughlin failed to establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, or indeed by any evidence at all, that the UFT was 
improperly motivated in any event when it gave McLaughlin 
incorrect information concerning the viability of his contract 
grievance and the timeliness of a contract grievance immediately 
following his termination from employment. The subsequent 
correction of that advice, the filing of a grievance which was in 
fact timely, and the efforts to achieve a resolution of the 
contract grievance negate any possible inference of improper 
motive. We affirm the ALJ's dismissal of this aspect of the 
charge upon both grounds. 
The final aspect of McLaughlin's charge and exceptions 
relates to the failure to respond to his June 28, 1988 request 
for a written explanation for the committee's decision not to 
proceed further with the contract grievance to step three and to 
grant his oral request for written confirmation of both the basis 
of the decision and the procedure for appealing that decision. 
With respect to the written request, the record establishes 
that McLaughlin's correspondence was received at the UFT's 
district office prior to its summer shutdown, but was not opened 
until September, following Gershon's return to work. Had this 
inquiry constituted an initial request for information about both 
the basis for the grievance committee's decision and the 
procedure for appealing that decision, the delay in responding 
Board - U-10355 -6 
following receipt at the UFT's district office might well have 
had serious consequences. However, the AKT found, and we 
agree, that McLaughlin's June 28 letter seeks nothing more than 
written confirmation of that which was already explained to him 
in detail during the June 6, 1988 telephone conversation, and 
does not seek information concerning the procedure for appealing 
the committee's decision. As the ALJ found, an employee 
organization has no statutory obligation to repeat its 
explanations for its decisions simply because a unit member 
requests that it do so, nor is an employee organization obligated 
to provide its explanation in the form requested by a unit 
member, so long as its explanation is communicated in a 
reasonably understandable fashion.-^/ In view of the AKJ's 
determination that the UFT's communication was adequate and 
reasonably clear under the circumstances of this case, with which 
we agree, we affirm the finding that the failure to respond to 
the June 28 letter did not breach the UFT's duty of fair 
representation and that the burden of proving a violation of the 
-^Gershon testified that he explained the basis of the 
grievance committee's decision, i.e. that McLaughlin had already 
been offered all of the relief to which the parties' agreement as 
administered entitled him, and that he explained the procedure 
for appealing the committee's decision. McLaughlin offered no 
testimony controverting this evidence, nor did he establish that 
he did not understand any of it, or that he communicated his lack 
of understanding during the telephone conversation. The 
explanation and information provided were, we find, reasonably 
understandable, notwithstanding the assertion in McLaughlin's 
June 28 letter that the explanation at least was not. See, PEF 
(Muragali), 14 PERB 53036 (1980); United Federation of Teachers 
XZedlarl, 17 PERB ?[4546 (1984) . 
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Act has not been sustained. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 
charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^«^<-*teu £*. 2 * * * 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
J 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE -NO. U-11688 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF MENTAL 
HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (STEVEN M. KLEIN, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) excepts to 
the Director's dismissal of its charge against the State of New 
York (Office of Mental Health) (State) which alleges that the 
State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it requested the State Civil Service 
Department to reallocate a unit position, Intensive Case Manager 
(ICM), from salary grade GS-22 to salary grade GS-23 because the 
State's admitted purpose was to try to avoid overtime payments to 
the ICMs which are otherwise required by the parties' 1988-91 
contract. Article 7.14 of that contract provides that unit 
Board - U-11688 
-2 
positions in salary grades GS-22 and below are eligible for 
overtime pay effective October 1, 1990. 
The Director notified PEF that its charge was deficient and 
he later dismissed the charge when PEF declined to withdraw it. 
The Director determined that reallocations are not mandatorily 
negotiable and that a reallocation request, even if made to avoid 
a consequence of a contractual provision, does not violate 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
PEF urges that we reinstate its charge because the State's 
request for a reallocation was not based upon changes in the job 
duties or responsibilities of the ICM position as allegedly 
required by the Civil Service Law. Rather, the State's letter to 
the Civil Service Department states that an upgrade for the ICMs 
is necessary because their overtime eligibility had the potential 
"to alter and interfere with the nature of ICM services" and "for 
significant alteration of the character of the job." PEF argues 
that the State violated its duty to negotiate in good faith 
because its request for a reallocation circumvents the bargaining 
process. 
The issue before us on exceptions to the Director's 
deficiency dismissal is whether the pleaded facts can support the 
violation alleged under any recognized or acceptable legal 
theory.-3=/ We affirm the Director's dismissal of PEF's charge 
^/citv of Yonkers. 23 PERB 53055 (1990) . 
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because no viable theory supporting a violation can be 
identified. 
PEF admittedly does not base its argument that the charge is 
legally sufficient upon the negotiability of the State's 
reallocation request. The charge also is not premised upon a 
claim of bad faith in the negotiation of the overtime provision. 
For example, PEF does not allege that the State never intended to 
honor its overtime agreement, that it withheld material 
information with the intent to mislead PEF or that it negotiated 
the overtime provision while intending to request a reallocation 
for the ICM position. In addition, this is not a unilateral 
change case because no change in eligibility for overtime 
compensation has yet been made.-2-/ The State's request to the 
Civil Service Department for a reallocation is, at most, an 
attempted change which is not ripe for determination. That same 
circumstance negates any application of a contract repudiation 
theory. From all that appears in the charge as pleaded or 
explained, overtime is being paid in accordance with the terms of 
the contract, and there is no allegation that the parties had an 
agreement to refrain from making reallocation requests unless 
^•/Compare the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
in County of Niagara, 23 PERB ^4534 (1990), relied upon by PEF, 
in which the employer effected a salary increase through a 
reallocation to salary grade. The ALT there held that an 
employer's reallocation of an unchanged position is a mandatorily 
negotiable wage determination. The factual differences between 
that case and this one make the ALT's reasoning inapplicable to 
the case before us. 
Board - U-11688 -< 
they were occasioned by a change in job duties or 
responsibilities. It is also not alleged that the State's 
request for a reallocation was made to deny employees their 
statutorily protected rights.^/ As the Director noted, there 
is no improper motive to be found in the State's mere invocation 
of a procedure available to it under law, resort to which is not 
barred by the contract, even if the State hopes through the 
successful utilization of that procedure to avoid what would 
otherwise be its contractual obligation.-4-/ 
By our dismissal of this charge, we express no opinion 
either as to whether the Civil Service Department should 
entertain, grant or deny the State's reallocation request or 
regarding the viability of a new charge should the State 
discontinue overtime payments to the ICMs. 
^-/Compare our decision in Board of Education of the CSD of 
the City of New York, 18 PERB J[3068 (1985) , in which we found 
that the use of proper management tools, such as 
reclassification, violates the Act if undertaken for the purpose 
of interfering with employees' rights of organization. 
^/savona CSD, 20 PERB [^3055 (1987) ; County of Nassau, 
16 PERB 53006 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 103 A.D.2d 274, 
17 PERB f7016 (2d Dep't 1984). Each of these cases stands for 
the proposition that an employer may take those steps necessary 
to eliminate the circumstances under which a contract right can 
be invoked if its action is not improperly motivated and is 
otherwise consistent with its duties under the Act. 
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Based upon the foregoing, PEF's exceptions are denied and 
the Director's decision is affirmed. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AD HOC COMMITTEE OP REGENTS COLLEGE 
DEGREES AND EXAMINATIONS 
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, 
CASE NO. DR-003 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling. 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for the Petitioner 
LOMBARDI, REINHARDT, WALSH & HARRISON, P.C. (THOMAS J. 
JORDAN, ESQ., of Counsel), for the University of the 
State of New York 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (RICHARD A. DAUTNER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for the State of New York 
BOARD DECLARATORY RULING 
This matter comes to us upon the exceptions of the 
University of the State of New York (USNY) and of the State 
of New York (State) to a declaratory ruling issued by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) pursuant to §210.1 of PERB's Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). The declaratory ruling was issued pursuant to a 
petition filed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Regents College 
Degrees and Examinations Professional Employees (Petitioner) 
which seeks a ruling from PERB whether the employees who 
comprise the petitioner are public employees within the 
meaning of §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). 
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Section 2 01.7(a) of the Act defines a public employee as 
"any person holding a position by appointment or employment 
in the service of a public employer . . . ." A public 
employer is defined at §201.6(a) of the Act as 
(i) The state of New York, (ii) a county, city, 
town, village or any other political subdivision or 
civil division of the state, (iii) a school 
district or any governmental entity operating a 
public school, college or university, (iv) a public 
improvement or special district, (v) a public 
authority, commission or public benefit 
corporation, or (vi) any other public corporation, 
agency or instrumentality or unit of government 
which exercises governmental powers under the laws 
of the state. 
Thus, the primary issue before the Director and before us is 
whether the employees who are members of the petitioner are 
employed by a public employer. 
In a decision dated April 3, 1990, the Director 
determined that members of petitioner are public employees 
employed solely by the State of New York, finding that 
"Regents College is so linked to the SED [State Education 
Department] in its operation, responsibilities and line of 
authority to the Commissioner of Education" as to be a part 
of the State of New York.-^ / In view of that determination, 
the Director did not make any finding regarding the public 
employer status of USNY. 
USNY has filed exceptions asserting that it is a private 
corporation exercising private proprietary functions and its 
1/Ad Hoc Committee of Regents College Degrees and Examinations 
Professional Employees, 23 PERB 5[6601, at 6605 (1990) . 
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employees are, therefore, not public employees within the 
meaning of the Act. The State asserts in its exceptions that 
the at-issue employees, if public, are not employees of SED. 
However, the Director's decision does not categorically 
identify the employer except as indicated above. 
Neither the State nor USNY, which have each appeared by 
counsel, asserts that Regents College is the employer of the 
at-issue employees. Regents College is assertedly a 
subsidiary of USNY, which directs its operation, administers 
its funds and issues its degrees. It accordingly appears 
that Regents College employees are deemed by the parties to 
be employees of USNY. We must therefore decide whether USNY 
itself is a public employer or whether, by virtue of its 
close involvement with the State and the exercise of 
governmental powers, the employer is ultimately the State, as 
the Director concluded. 
FACTS 
Regents College is administered by the University of the 
State of New York (USNY), an institution first chartered by 
the New York State Legislature in 1784 and whose duties and 
responsibilities were subsequently defined at §2 01 et seq. of 
the Education Law. In addition to the operation of Regents 
College, USNY is responsible for operating the New York State 
Library and the New York State Museum, both of which are 
staffed entirely by public employees within the State 
Education Department (SED). The President of USNY is, by 
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statute, the Commissioner of Education, who, in addition to 
his responsibilities for the operation of USNY, is 
responsible for the operation of the SED. The Commissioner 
of Education/President of USNY reports to the Board of 
Regents, who are also, by statute, the Regents of USNY. The 
members of the Board of Regents/Regents of USNY are appointed 
by the Legislature and are deemed to be public officers, 
pursuant to §2 Public Officers Law and §203 Education Law. 
The authority to increase, diminish or modify the powers of 
the Board of Regents is vested in the Legislature (Article 
11, §2 NYS Constitution). 
Regents College itself is headed by C. Wayne Williams, 
Executive Director. Williams reports through Donald Nolan, 
Deputy Commissioner of Higher Education at SED, to the 
Commissioner of Education/President of USNY, Thomas Sobol. 
Prior to 1986, when Williams was appointed Executive Director 
of Regents College by the Commissioner of Education/President 
of USNY, SED staff were assigned the responsibility for the 
day-to-day operation of Regents College. Some of Regents 
College's fiscal officers are SED employees while others are 
USNY employees, and its legal services are usually (although 
not in the instant case) provided by SED Counsel's office. 
Regents College is divided into two divisions defined by 
function: Regents College Examinations and Regents College 
Degrees. Regents College Examinations administers the 
College Proficiency Examination Program established 
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originally in 1963 by the Board of Regents. This program is 
operated by SED, and is staffed primarily by SED employees, 
although USNY/Regents College employees also work on the 
examination program. The Regents College Degrees program 
awards Associate and Baccalaureate degrees and is primarily 
staffed by Regents College/USNY employees, although some SED 
employees also work in this program. 
All but one of the SED employees who work at Regents 
College are paid by State monies from the Executive Budget, 
are represented in State bargaining units and are members of 
the New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System. 
These employees represent approximately 22 of the 160 
employees who work for Regents College. The remaining 
employees are paid from USNY funds, are not represented in 
State bargaining units, and are not members of the State and 
Local Employees' Retirement System, although they are 
eligible to participate in the New York State health 
insurance programs. 
Regents College is housed in the Cultural Education 
Building, which houses SED. However, USNY funds are utilized 
to pay for the space occupied by Regents College. 
RULING 
In its exceptions to the Director's decision, USNY 
contests numerous factual and legal determinations made by 
the Director. At the outset, USNY contends that the Board of 
Regents acts in a private capacity when it functions as the 
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Board of Directors of USNY and that it is in its private 
capacity that it directs USNY and, through it, Regents 
College. It goes on to argue that USNY is a private 
educational institution, chartered by the New York State 
Legislature in 1784, as were all corporations at that time. 
USNY's latter contention disregards the establishment of 
statutory functions contained in Article 5 of the Education 
Law (see §201 et seq. Education Law). The establishment, by 
statute, of the functions and duties of the USNY creates a 
significant distinction between it and other educational 
institutions created by legislative corporate charter,-2-/ 
and supports the determination that USNY is either a public 
university operated by a governmental entity or is itself a 
unit of government exercising governmental powers under the 
laws of the State. 
This conclusion is not affected by the fact that USNY is 
substantially supported by private foundation grants, fees 
paid by program users, and a trust fund established in 1784 
at the time of its creation.-3-/ Other entities held to be 
public employers are either supported entirely by revenues 
(such as the New York Off-Track Betting Corporations) or are 
^Compare Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518 and 
Hamburger v. Cornell University, 184 A.D. 463 (1918), where 
colleges which were originally chartered by state legislatures were 
otherwise deemed to be private educational institutions. 
•^See State of New York (Insurance Dept. Liquidation Bureau) , 
20 PERB 57021 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1987), aff'd, 146 A.D.2d 961, 
22 PERB 57008 (3d Dep't 1989). 
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entitled to receive grant monies (see, e.g., §297 Executive 
Law, which authorizes the Commissioner of the New York State 
Division of Human Rights to apply for and receive grant 
monies). 
In a 1987 submission to the Middle States Association of 
Colleges and Schools, USNY identified its staff as follows: 
Gordon Ambach, President of The 
University of the State of New York and 
Commissioner of Education 
Donald J. Nolan, Deputy Commissioner for 
Higher Education and Professional Education 
C. Wayne Williams, Executive Director, Regents 
College Degrees and Examinations... 
In the same publication USNY describes itself as follows: 
Regents college degrees are granted 
through the degree-granting authority of 
the Board of Regents of the University of 
the State of New York, a unique 
educational body. Established in 1784 by 
the State Legislature, the long-term 
purpose of the University of the State of 
New York was to create a unified 
educational system for the people of New 
York under the control of State 
government. It is now the oldest and 
most comprehensive State educational 
agency in the nation. It encompasses and 
has responsibility for all educational 
institutions at all levels in the State, 
including more than 240 independent and 
public higher education institutions, as 
well as elementary and secondary schools, 
museums, libraries, historical societies, 
and other agencies whose primary purpose 
is education. 
Presiding over the University is the 
Board of Regents, composed of 16 lay men 
and women elected by the Legislature for 
seven-year terms. The Regents appoint a 
commissioner who serves simultaneously as 
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the President of the University of the 
State of New York and as the Chief 
Executive Officer of the State Education 
Department. The Regents and the 
Commissioner determine the State's 
educational policies, establish standards 
for maintaining quality schools, charter 
colleges and universities, approve and 
supervise academic programs leading to 
college degrees, and license all 
professions except law. The Regents also 
have the authority to grant undergraduate 
and graduate degrees under §108 of the 
Education Law of New York State. The 
executive and administrative arm of the 
University is the State Education 
Department, (emphasis added) 
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that USNY 
considers itself to be other than a private educational 
institution. Its own characterization of itself as a "state 
educational agency" supports the petitioner's claim that it 
is a public university and a public employer. USNY is a 
public university, not because it was originally chartered in 
1784 by the State Legislature (a fact which appears to be 
immaterial to its present status), but because its duties and 
functions are prescribed by the State Legislature and 
reserved to the State Legislature by Article 11, §2 of the 
State Constitution. 
Insofar as USNY argues that it functions nonetheless in 
a private, proprietary capacity in its administration of 
Regents College, we view the decision in State of New York 
(Insurance Department Liquidation Bureau) v. PERB, supra, to 
be dispositive. In that case, the Supreme Court and 
Appellate Division concluded that the fact that employees do 
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not have civil service status and are not paid out of State 
funds does not make them nonpublic, where the employer is a 
public officer appointed by a governmental officer or entity 
(here, the State Legislature) and who is politically 
accountable for the performance of his/her duties. In the 
instant case, the Commissioner of Education, who holds his 
position as President of USNY solely by virtue of his 
Commissioner status, is appointed by the Board of Regents and 
confirmed by the State Senate. The members of the Board of 
Regents are themselves public officers appointed by the 
Legislature. Thus, the Board of Directors of USNY and its 
chief executive officer are public officials politically 
accountable to the New York State Legislature. Furthermore, 
the establishment, by statute, of the functions and 
responsibilities of USNY, and the fact that its functions and 
responsibilities may be modified by the State Legislature 
establish the exercise of governmental powers by USNY. 
In accord with this ruling is a determination issued by 
the Regional Director Region 3, National Labor Relations 
Board, on May 22, 1989, which finds USNY (and therefore 
Regents College) to be outside its jurisdiction because it is 
a public employer. In its exceptions before us, USNY 
contends that the NLRB determination is not properly before 
us, nor was it properly before the Director because it was 
not offered and received in evidence before the record was 
closed. This exception ignores both the fact that the 
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determination was not rendered until after the record was 
closed and the fact that an administrative agency 
determination is a matter of which we may take administrative 
notice (State Administrative Procedure Act §306 and CPLR 
§4511). Whether appropriately received as evidence which 
came into being after the record was closed, for which the 
record could be reopened and the determination received or as 
a sister agency decision of which we may take administrative 
notice, the decision is properly before us and may be 
considered. The exception in this regard is accordingly 
denied. 
Based upon the foregoing, USNY is an "instrumentality or 
unit of government which exercises governmental powers" under 
§201.6(a)(vi) of the Act and/or a "governmental entity 
operating a public . . . university" within the meaning of 
§201.6(la)(iii) of the Act. 
Therefore, the members of the Petitioner are public 
employees of USNY through its subsidiary Regents College. To 
the extent that the Director's decision may be interpreted to 
conclude that the at-issue employees are employed by the 
State of New York or by SED specifically, we decline to adopt 
the Director's ruling. To that extent, therefore, we accept 
the exceptions of the State of New York, which contends in 
the proceedings before us that neither the State nor SED is 
the employer of the aforementioned employees. 
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Based upon the foregoing, we declare the employees which 
comprise the Petitioner to be public employees within the 
meaning of §2 01.7(a) of the Act. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member ( 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CATTARAUGUS COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS 
DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES UNION OF 
CATTARAUGUS COUNTY LOCAL 805, 
CSEA/AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10331 
COUNTY OF CATTARAUGUS and SHERIFF 
OF CATTARAUGUS COUNTY, 
Respondents. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIQUEL ORTIZ, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
LOUIS C. FULKERSON, for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Cattaraugus County Deputy Sheriffs Department Employees 
Union of Cattaraugus County Local 805, CSEA/AFSCME, Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to the dismissal, after hearing, of its 
improper practice charge against the County of Cattaraugus 
and Sheriff of Cattaraugus County (jointly, the County). 
The charge alleges that the County violated §§209-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it terminated David Raiport, President of CSEA's Deputy 
Sheriffs Department Employees Union, because of his union 
activities. 
Raiport, an employee having 16 years of service, was 
terminated from his employment on August 10, 1988, in 
V. 
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accordance with an arbitration award issued pursuant to the 
parties1 collective bargaining agreement, upon charges of 
misconduct. The disciplinary charges against Raiport allege 
that he either filed a false accident report on June 9, 
1984, or gave sworn testimony on June 21, 1988, in the trial 
following the accident which was the subject of the report, 
that was neither adequate nor impartial. The penalty sought 
by the County was discharge, and the arbitrator upheld the 
County's position in the following terms: 
The evidence proves beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Deputy Sheriff/Fire 
Investigator, David Raiport, committed 
one of two serious offenses: Either he 
intentionally withheld significant 
information in filing an accident report, 
on June 9, 1984, causing considerable 
harm to other parties, or he gave sworn 
testimony in his trial appearance on 
June 21, 1988, that was neither adequate 
nor impartial.^ Either offense 
provides a reasonable basis for 
discharge of even a senior officer. 
While the factual findings made by the arbitrator are 
not in dispute before us, CSEA alleges that Raiport was the 
subject of disparate treatment by the County in insisting 
upon discharge as the appropriate penalty for the offense 
alleged. In support of its claim, CSEA points to prior 
conduct by the County in its dealings with Raiport which, it 
asserts, establishes anti-union animus. CSEA also asserts 
) i/The arbitrator found the accident report and testimony to 
be in direct contradiction of each other. 
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that other deputy sheriffs alleged to have engaged in 
equally serious misconduct have been offered and received 
lesser penalties than discharge. 
In dismissing the charge, the assigned Administrative 
Law Judge (ALT) made numerous credibility determinations in 
reaching the conclusion that the prior conduct of the County 
failed to establish anti-union animus against Raiport. The 
ALJ accepted as credible County evidence of legitimate 
business reasons for some of its conduct (e.cr. , taking away 
Raiport's keys to the main building and cellblock area, a 
reprimand for gas purchases other than at County facilities 
except in emergencies, and returning him to duty in a 
uniform and marked car except when conducting arson 
investigations). The ALJ also made credibility 
determinations adverse to Raiport in finding that his 
performance evaluations were not downgraded following his 
union involvement, and that he was not threatened by the 
County's Undersheriff with "trouble" if he became CSEA's 
President, contrary to his testimony. 
Having reviewed the record in this matter, which 
consists of numerous exhibits and four days of testimony, we 
find that the ALJ's factual findings are fully supported by 
the record, and that no basis exists for disturbing the 
credibility determinations made. We accordingly affirm the 
ALJ's determination that CSEA has failed to establish, by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, animus against Raiport 
because of his union activity prior to his discipline and 
discharge. 
It remains to be decided by us whether, as asserted by 
CSEA, the disciplinary action taken against Raiport is so 
disparate as to give rise to an inference of discrimination 
because of union activity. For the following reasons, we 
find that it does not. 
We concur with the ALT * s finding that there are no 
incidents involving similar offenses, either alleged or 
charged as acts of misconduct, to which the offense found to 
be committed by Raiport can appropriately be compared, 
particularly during the time frame found by the ALJ to be 
relevant (i.e., during the tenure of the Sheriff in office 
at the time of Raiport's discipline and discharge). The ALJ 
also found that the offenses alleged by CSEA to be similar 
in seriousness to the offense found by the arbitrator to 
have been committed by Raiport are not in fact similar 
enough for comparison. The examples cited by CSEA as 
similar in seriousness involve "instances of poor work 
performance, incompetence or insubordination by deputy 
sheriffs or corrections officers" (CSEA exceptions). These 
differ in significant degree from the nature of either 
offense addressed by the arbitrator. Although the 
arbitrator did not determine which of the offenses was in 
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fact committed, he found that either offense constituted an 
intentional act affecting the credibility and integrity of 
the Sheriff's Department.2/ The ALJ concluded that such 
intentional acts are of a greater degree of seriousness than 
acts constituting prior work performance, incompetence or 
insubordination. 
It is our determination that the ALJ correctly 
concluded that the examples cited by CSEA in support of its 
claim of disparate treatment for similar offenses did not in 
fact establish any similarity of offenses, nor does it 
establish that offenses of similar seriousness were subject 
to disparate penalty. This conclusion is buttressed by the 
arbitrator's award, which upholds the proposed penalty of 
discharge, rather than merely constituting the County's 
opinion of the appropriate penalty. There is no claim 
before us that the arbitration proceeding and award fails in 
any way to meet standards enunciated by this Board in New 
York City Trantsit Authority (Bordansky), 4 PERB f3031 
(1971). Deferral to the arbitrator's findings of fact is 
accordingly appropriate. Similarly, the penalty assessed by 
the arbitrator will not be disturbed unless it can be 
^The June 9, 1984 accident report prepared by Raiport 
indicated that the only contributing factor to the one-vehicle 
accident was "pavement defective", while, in his testimony at the 
civil trial against the pavement contractor and Town of Perrys-
burg, where the accident occurred, Raiport testified that the 
plaintiff's own actions were a major contributing factor in the 
accident. 
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established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
disciplinary charges would not have been brought, nor the 
penalty of discharge sought, but for activity protected by 
the Act. We affirm the ALJ's finding that this burden has 
not been met in the instant case. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
'/?A& 
:old R. Newman, Chairman 
1\AS*4A+~ Z -
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND EXTENSION BOARD 
SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3550 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND EXTENSION BOARD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Vocational Education and 
Extension Board Supervisors' Association has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All chief instructors/supervisors and all 
assistant chief instructors/supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Vocational Education and 
Extension Board Supervisors' Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membfer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 649, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3746 
TOWN OF WIRT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters, Local 649, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operator, Laborer, Mechanic. 
Excluded: Supervisors, Clerical, Guards and all others. 
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- 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters, Local 649. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Memfcrer 
A^t^CtU 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3734 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT OPERATING 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Law 
Enforcement Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating 
Authority Police Department employees in the 
title "Road Patrolman 1st class, Patrolman 2nd 
Class and Sergeant." 
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Excluded: All other titles, including the title "General 
Superintendent - Police." 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Law 
Enforcement Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate .collectively...._.._ 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: January 29, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem: 
